Cameron Hubbard – The Stanford Daily https://stanforddaily.com Breaking news from the Farm since 1892 Wed, 16 May 2018 17:33:23 +0000 en-US hourly 1 https://wordpress.org/?v=6.4.3 https://stanforddaily.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/cropped-DailyIcon-CardinalRed.png?w=32 Cameron Hubbard – The Stanford Daily https://stanforddaily.com 32 32 204779320 Philosophy: The case for contradicting motivations in college https://stanforddaily.com/2018/05/16/philosophy-the-case-for-contradicting-motivations-in-college/ https://stanforddaily.com/2018/05/16/philosophy-the-case-for-contradicting-motivations-in-college/#respond Wed, 16 May 2018 18:00:59 +0000 https://stanforddaily.com/?p=1141094 College is a central part of the American, and perhaps now the world’s, coming-of-age narrative. Elite universities like Stanford epitomize this role, as Stanford’s marketing department make clear. However, universities have detached themselves from their origins as highly isolated centers of learning, once populated largely by monks and clergy and with the purpose of producing […]

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College is a central part of the American, and perhaps now the world’s, coming-of-age narrative. Elite universities like Stanford epitomize this role, as Stanford’s marketing department make clear. However, universities have detached themselves from their origins as highly isolated centers of learning, once populated largely by monks and clergy and with the purpose of producing researchers.

Today, the function of college is decidedly more complex. Its most explicit mission, as stated by the institutions themselves, is to provide students with a specialized education in a chosen subject along with some general competency in other areas. This dovetails nicely with the generally accepted idea that the role of universities, beyond educating students, is to create and promote new knowledge. On the other hand, there is strong empirical evidence to suggest that the public also considers college as a form of social education. Not in the traditional sense of students learning manners, but of students learning how to situate their various identities in relation to others and to themselves.

The ethnographic work “My Freshman Year” by anthropologist Rebekah Nathan suggests that for some students, academic considerations are wholly tangential to their desire to attend and stay in college. This observation, along with other factors, might help explain the increase in average graduation time at many universities over the past few decades. Universities themselves have started recognizing their functions as not wholly academic, with many of them instituting wellness and recreation initiatives.

Both of these two major functions provided by a college education can plausibly be construed under a single heading: Colleges aim to provide an individual with the abilities that are required to flourish (where we can broadly define “flourish” as someone living an exemplary, admirable, and perhaps happy life).

Nothing of this seems wrong. In fact, it seems like rather a good thing. What would be troubling, however, would be if these major functions contradicted each other, like when these goals cannot be accomplished by the same person. There are numerous ways in which such a contradiction could exist. However, here I want to look at a particularly interesting case of contradiction.

This case of contradiction could be termed as motivational conflict, which is especially prominent here at Stanford as many students exhibit a variety of interests and struggle to reconcile distinct aspects of their identities. The concept itself is best illustrated by an example. Suppose you are motivated to do whatever it takes to maximize the happiness of your spouse. As it turns out, the best way to achieve this is to actually love your spouse. However, it is a fundamental part of the concept of romantic love that one cannot love instrumentally (for the sake of some further goal). Promoting maximum happiness is a further goal; therefore, if you possess this as an overriding motive, you cannot (coherently) possess a motive to love your wife. In our case for Stanford, suppose that one is overridingly motivated to be an exceptional academic student. Can one still gain the social education needed for flourishing? The question can be posed the other way round as well.

It seems to me that the answer is yes, you can have it all, and here is why. Imagine that you are that overridingly motivated student. You will do everything that possible to realize academic goals, which requires you to adopt certain motivations about studiousness, sleep, and more. You might think that the motivations required to perform socially (like the willingness to attend parties and stay up late talking to friends) are directly contrary to staying in your room to study and sleep early.

However, this is a mistake. If one devotes too much of oneself into academic work (as many Stanford students do, especially those in demanding technical programs), there are various negative consequences. For one, you are unlikely to be struck by the creative inspirations that the outside world can prompt (for a funny example, several chemicals have been discovered by scientists on LSD). The world is a social environment, even for academics. If you never learn those skills, the deficit will eventually catch up with you. You might just burn out. Thus, the motivations required for non-academic activities may mitigate burn-out in a way that maximizes flourishing. These activities need not be pure entertainment, although they can be. At the very least, these activities need to focus mostly on actual people, rather than on texts, problems, or abstract notions of people and communities.

What about the other extreme case, where the student is overridingly social? Well, first we ought to clear up a likely confusion. The student who spends all their nights drunk is not actually realizing any positive social benefits. Actual socializing consists of exercising practical wisdom in choosing what actions are appropriate for a given situation. It might be permissible (or potentially good) to go out drinking with friends, but it is rarely wise to drink alone every night. I personally suggest that the motivation required for academic work will be helpful in constraining an individual’s more extreme social impulses, so these two competing desires will moderate the other.

The upshot is that college offers an opportunity to learn a diverse array of skills that contribute to someone flourishing. Nonetheless, it is not necessarily easy to realize all of these skills at once, which something to keep in mind. But a key part of growing up is striking the right balance of competing motivations.

Contact Cam Hubbard at camh502 ‘at’ stanford.edu.

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Clickbait Philosophy: Can cursing KILL YOU? https://stanforddaily.com/2018/03/07/clickbait-philosophy-can-cursing-kill-you/ https://stanforddaily.com/2018/03/07/clickbait-philosophy-can-cursing-kill-you/#respond Thu, 08 Mar 2018 05:50:49 +0000 https://stanforddaily.com/?p=1138000 My mother used to tell me that profanity was for those who weren’t creative enough to think of another word to use. I never gave much thought to the saying. Although I must say, I never took it to heart. However, a recent article in the Daily, which to the best of my understanding had […]

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My mother used to tell me that profanity was for those who weren’t creative enough to think of another word to use. I never gave much thought to the saying. Although I must say, I never took it to heart. However, a recent article in the Daily, which to the best of my understanding had something to do with Marc Tessier-Lavigne, has prompted me to reconsider the place of profanity in serious forms of communication. As is well known, great authors like Shakespeare, Plato, Joyce have all utilized profanity. Were they wrong to do so? Should we expect our journalistic media to refrain from such usage?

At the outset, it seems helpful to me to distinguish two classes of ill-mannered words, which are generally lumped together: Slurs and curses. Slurs, as is well know, generally have a particular group, generally racial, ethnic or religious, as their referent and tend to be associated with a negatively stereotyped version of said group. As such, prohibition of slurs can find a basis in the standard arguments against discrimination, for respecting basic dignity, etc… On the other hand, curses are instances of profanity, which have no such particular target. Examples of words I have in mind here include “damn,” “fuck” and “hell.” Some curses seem to be derived from slurs, for instance, “son of a bitch,” but in this derivation they seem to loosen their connection with the pejorative stereotype of the slur (this particular observation may evoke differing intuitions).

It is hard to decide precisely what it is that curses convey semantically. All of the above cited examples have a relatively precise meaning in the English language, but their general use as curses departs radically from that definition. We can see this in the fact that some semantically different curses are virtually interchangeable in use. It seems, then, that the best description we can provide of them will be pragmatic, about what they do, rather than semantic, about what they mean. A comprehensive listing of such uses is probably impossible. Here, I will content myself with a short survey of some common reasons for using curses. We might use them when angry, as vocal expression of that anger. For instance, when telling someone to “fuck off,” the speaker is not, in general, really telling the listener to do anything in particular. He is simply making known his general dissatisfaction. We sometimes uses curses in a similar way, to express pain or dissatisfaction. Sometimes, curses are used for emphasis, as in the phrase “That’s not the fucking point.” We can view them as colloquial exclamation marks. There are also dialects of English in which the regular use of curses is simply a part of the pattern of speech, in much the way that “y’all” replaces “you all” in the southern vernacular. Finally, the negative social connotation given to curses has the potential to play a subversive role in discourse. We thus sometimes use them to cultivate a general tone of resistance or rebellion.

It seems to me that none of these uses provide us with a clear avenue for ruling out the use of such words. In fact, in virtue of their role as emphasizers and as markers of rebellion, it seems to be the case that there may be instances in which curse words can do the job better than any other word. Nonetheless, these same features point out how the use of curses can be misleading. They tend to be rhetorical words and their overuse can be used to mask a lack of content. Additionally, norms of decency and politeness entail that it is not always right or appropriate to express anger openly. Certainly, within the context of journalism, it sometimes is, but this should be a careful decision on a case-by-case basis.

I’ll end by returning to my mother’s original sentiment, that curses imply a lack of stylistic originality. Well, the works of Shakespeare, among others, provide us with a clear counterexample. However, I do think there is something like a grain of truth here. The rhetorical power of curse words derives in part from their sparing and deliberate use. They have the potential, like clichéd metaphors, to become dead quickly. Thus, part of the stylistic challenge of their use, when they are appropriate, is also deliberating leaving them out elsewhere. Finding an appropriate substitute is a creative act. Using a dead expression, like using a cliché, is not. If an author insists on using them this way regardless, then maybe she would be better off not writing anything at all.

 

Contact Cam Hubbard at camh502 ‘at’ stanford.edu.

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Clickbait Philosophy: Everything you thought you knew about ethics IS WRONG https://stanforddaily.com/2018/02/06/clickbait-philosophy-everything-you-thought-you-knew-about-ethics-is-wrong/ https://stanforddaily.com/2018/02/06/clickbait-philosophy-everything-you-thought-you-knew-about-ethics-is-wrong/#respond Tue, 06 Feb 2018 23:30:54 +0000 https://stanforddaily.com/?p=1136234 There is always some difficulty in connecting the domains of academic moral philosophy and ordinary public discourse on moral issues. On the one hand, moral philosophers, and perhaps philosophers in general, have a tendency to disregard the thoughts and opinions of those outside the discipline. Such laymen, so the line goes, are not qualified to […]

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There is always some difficulty in connecting the domains of academic moral philosophy and ordinary public discourse on moral issues. On the one hand, moral philosophers, and perhaps philosophers in general, have a tendency to disregard the thoughts and opinions of those outside the discipline. Such laymen, so the line goes, are not qualified to speak. It is likely that they have no firm conscious moral principles, that they lack the seriousness that the discipline requires and most simply, they are just too stupid to have much to say. Such a position, it goes without saying, is extreme and erroneous. I do not expect that any particular philosopher alive today would represent him or herself as embodying it, but nonetheless as a caricature, it serves to illustrate some of the subconscious biases of the discipline.

On the other hand, ordinary citizens are likely to view moral philosophy as a lot of hot air. Morality for them isn’t about propositions, deductions and systems. Furthermore, it’s not something to be considered in abstract from the armchair. It is something to be lived. Perhaps the best characterization of this objection comes from within philosophy itself. Philosopher Bernard Williams once famously noted, “most moral philosophy at most times has been empty and boring … contemporary moral philosophy has found an original way of being boring, which is by not discussing moral issues at all.”

Unfortunately, given the difficulty of the project, navigating the horns of this dilemma is essential to evolving morally as a society. Caching out the precise reason for this is important. Here, I would like to proceed by way of an example, in which I demonstrate the value of theoretical work for public discourse. Public moral discourse is often characterized by a penchant for extreme rhetoric. This is evident in discussions of identity politics, content warnings, free speech, etc. It is generally character directed, in that the other side is viewed not just as an opposing view, but also as a potentially evil force. It follows then that reconciliation, calm debate and compromise are not common features of these discussions, particularly as concerns hot button issues. This is not an entirely bad thing — we need a fair amount of motivation in order to enact our moral projects in the first place. The problem creeps in when we are absolutely certain that we have the right in a given situation. This represents a profound failure to recognize the general pervasiveness of human fallibility, and it suffices to completely shut down a discussion. I would suggest that this certitude actually arises from an implicitly assumed philosophical position; namely, moral intuitionism.

Moral intuitionism is a theory that has a long history in philosophy. It was prominent in Anglophone philosophy of the early 20th century, perhaps most notably expounded by the philosopher G.E. Moore. The general thesis of moral intuition is epistemic: we come to know what is right and wrong by intuition. These intuitions are self-evident, almost ineffable grasping of moral truths. This stands in opposition to philosophical theories that claim that knowledge of ethics is based on knowledge of rationality or of utility calculations. Now, for the purposes of this article, it will not be necessary to go into the weeds of the debate about the various merits of the position. It will suffice to note some general characteristics. First, intuitionism is individualistic because it is unmediated — that is to say that nothing stands between you and the truth. We remove the psychological impression of uncertainty by removing degrees of separation. Second, moral intuitions, as shown by the work of numerous psychologists, are highly affected by one’s education, culture and current social group (for more information, refer to the book “The Righteous Mind by Jonathan Haidt). Thus, we can see how equally intelligent people can exhibit comparable degrees of certainty about their moral correctness by analyzing their respective backgrounds. This also provides an explanation for the fact that moral positions are often criticized by way of ad hominem attacks on the character of their holder.

I do not, of course, wish to give the impression that moral intuitionism is consciously entertained as a position by those who have for the most part never heard of it. I am simply suggesting that it is the way of thinking about morality that has become prominent in folk discussions. If this is so, then theoretical philosophy offers us a way forward. By criticizing or affirming the reasons underpinning an adoption of moral intuitionism, we can see whether this is a good position to be taking in the first place. Optimistically, we might then hope to adopt our moral psychology thusly going forward. In the specific case of, for instance, identity politics, we can come to appreciate and control the the various intuitions about the role identity should play in public and university life, insofar as we can consciously place ourselves in the position of others and dispense with the idea that our intuitions are somehow uniquely privileged (or at least, the unthinking idea that they are privileged because they are ours). This is a particularly apt application because identity politics is almost by definition an area in which individuals bring to bear a wide variety of different intuitions based on different experiences.

I should stress that this is an optimistic claim. It is not likely that theorizing will be able to provide a compelling reason for change to many people. This is where we see the converse of the claim the public morality needs moral philosophy. Insofar as moral philosophy aims at increasing the moral standing of the world, it needs to learn the tools of public discourse that have been successful and learn to take seriously moral issues that are of grave seriousness to laymen. To do so, it seems to me, will be to mount a successful answer to Williams’ charge that moral philosophy is peculiarly empty and boring.

 

Contact Cameron Hubbard at cam502 ‘at’ stanford.edu.

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Clickbait Philosophy: Navigating the path to free speech https://stanforddaily.com/2018/01/30/clickbait-philosophy-free-speech/ https://stanforddaily.com/2018/01/30/clickbait-philosophy-free-speech/#respond Wed, 31 Jan 2018 00:53:25 +0000 https://stanforddaily.com/?p=1135817 Clickbait Philosophy is a new weekly Reads beat column published in the Wednesday issue of The Daily. Each week, we will tackle a new philosophical issue that has an impact on undergraduate life. We hope to provide philosophical perspectives not usually found within the pages of this paper. Over the past few years, the topic […]

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Clickbait Philosophy: Navigating the path to free speech
Courtesy of Wikimedia Commons

Clickbait Philosophy is a new weekly Reads beat column published in the Wednesday issue of The Daily. Each week, we will tackle a new philosophical issue that has an impact on undergraduate life. We hope to provide philosophical perspectives not usually found within the pages of this paper.

Over the past few years, the topic of what should and should not be said on a university campus has taken on a very public character. Free speech, according to some, is the pinnacle of academic integrity. Anything can and should be up for discussion, or we risk falling into a form of vicious dogmatism. On the other hand, there are those who argue that there are some topics that are of such a nature that the very act of debating them constitutes an implicit endorsement. On this line of thought, we ought, for instance, to deny a platform for debating the tenants of fascism. To do so is to legitimize and enable evil.

For those involved, the stakes of this debate are incredibly high. This probably has something to do with the sense of urgency that it engenders. This is likely to inspire extreme opinions on both sides. However, it seems to me that a middle path with regard to free speech is correct. There are few things that we can feel comfortable saying are unqualified goods (i.e. that we ought to pursue them whatever the consequences). Nonetheless, we will equally be misled if we think that utilitarian calculations about silencing views we think are incorrect straightforwardly justify censorship. Indeed, that whole approach to the debate is deeply misguided. A truly complete account of the role freedom of speech in a modern society will be able to capture both its defeasibility and its centrality to our political thought and commitments. This will be a nuanced and piecemeal project. Each of the works outlined below is one step, I believe, towards its completion.

John Stuart Mill, “On Liberty”

“On Liberty” is essential background reading for anyone interested in the free speech debate. It has been of enormous intellectual significance since its publication and has had probably the most policy impact of any book on this list. The gist of the thesis, however, is relatively simple. Human beings are highly fallible creatures. As such, we tend to have levels of confidence in our beliefs that are out of proportion with the evidence for such beliefs. For instance, when we have social support for a proposition, we tend to view its truth with more certainty than we should. Likewise, when we are plagued with self-doubt, we have trouble mustering any confidence — e.g. the adolescent who believes himself to be unlikable will not be able to adequately appreciate the counter-evidence that he in fact has an average number of friends. Mill argues that the best way to mitigate this fallibility is to encourage a diversity of viewpoints, which a society can then collectively evaluate. Mill’s preferred method of evaluation is democratic, and this work has long been seen as a cornerstone of classical liberalism. However, to those who find themselves outside this camp, Mill poses a fundamental challenge: Find a better solution to human fallibility.

Helen Longino, “The Fate of Knowledge”

Helen Longino is a distinguished philosopher of science and biology and a longtime member of the Stanford faculty. In this important book, she discusses the idea of knowledge, particularly as derived from science, in a social context. She proposes that the institution of science is fundamentally biased in numerous ways. While this bias is not wholly correctable, Longino argues that the most intellectually responsible reaction is to encourage a far-reaching pluralism, both within scientific research itself and with regard to scientific researchers. The best form of science will be the one that has the highest viewpoint diversity, as exemplified by some case studies from the history of science. In some ways, this is a broadly Millian line (as Longino acknowledges); however, the detailed application to the topic of science makes it clear that freedom of speech is not just a political issue. Furthermore, Stanford’s mission qua university is to pursue new knowledge. It is important to recognize the extent to which viewpoint pluralism is necessary for this to be possible.

Plato, “The Republic”

As one of the foremost theorists of all time, Plato generally needs no introduction. In this, perhaps his most seminal work, he offers a philosophical account of just about everything. For those interested in free speech, however, the sections in Books II, III and X on poetry deserve special attention. Here Plato argues that the perfect state will have to make pragmatic concession to with regard to freedom of speech, since many forms of speech have an exceptional power to corrupt. This thesis has lead to many modern political theorists expressing considerable uncomfortableness with the work. Nonetheless, Plato’s position is exceptionally well argued. He shows us the logical ends to which some of our intuitive commitments may lead. We might well decide that moral necessity justifies authoritarianism. But to the extent that we want to reject this option, potentially even for Millian reasons, we need to impose not just practical but theoretical boundaries on moralizing.

Jason Stanley, “How Propaganda Works”

This book is not about free speech per se but rather about the power of language in society, both contemporary and historical. Jason Stanley is an exceptionally intelligent philosopher and a clear writer. Here he reminds us just how important public discourse can be by directing our attention not just to the power of semantic content but also to the rhetorical power of the way we choose to express that content. The idea that there are power dynamics behind all social activities is not new, but this work offers a particularly reasonable account of it. It is an essential part of any position on free speech that it be able to treat public discourse as not just as an ideal but also as a phenomenon situated in history and practice. This book starts us down that path.

Bernard Williams, “Truth and Truthfulness”

Written by the most important moral philosopher of the last half-century, this book deals with the relevance of the concept of truth and the propensity to tell the truth for human societies. Williams is especially concerned with answering the challenge of many postmodernists and pragmatists, who claim that truth is a sham concept and that power is really what is at play in social discourse. To my view, Williams is successful insofar as he shows just how important the notion of truth is to societies that wish to honor things like human dignity and rights, and that therefore truthfulness must be amongst the highest virtues of those societies. This reminds us that we need not be just concerned with the political ramifications of beliefs but also whether or not those beliefs are actually correct. Discourse about free speech cannot just be a discussion about power and marginalization. This may come at a tremendous emotional cost, but it is necessary. To quote Williams, himself partially quoting Nietzsche, “they are brave animals, ‘who have been taught to sacrifice desirability to truth, every truth, even a plain, bitter, ugly, foul, unchristian, immoral truth … because there are such truths.‘”  

 

Contact Cam Hubbard at camh502 ‘at’ stanford.edu.

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