Powers discusses endowment gains after last year’s drop

Stanford Management Company (SMC) announced that its merged pool, the University’s principal investment pool, secured a 14.4 percent investment gain in the year that ended June 30, 2010. The merged pool, which includes most of the endowment, was valued at $15.9 billion.

The endowment itself had a reported $13.8 billion value as of Aug. 31, 2010, representing a 9.6 percent increase over the previous fiscal year.

These figures show a solid rebound from the 25.9 percent loss the merged pool suffered last year, the largest single-year plummet in the University’s history. The endowment dropped sharply from $17.2 billion to $12.6 billion during this period.

According to John Powers, chief executive of SMC, the recent gains are well aligned with the management company’s goals. SMC aims to enable Stanford to meet its payouts, to build up the endowment to increase the University’s resources and to operate at an appropriate level of risk.

“At 14.4 percent, we’re both meeting all of our obligations to the University and significantly growing the value of the endowment…so we met our goals, absolutely,” Powers said.

The Road to Recovery

Stanford’s investment gains this past year had much to do with improved market conditions, as well as deliberate actions by SMC.

“It was a strong year for both equity and credit in general, but what made it a good year for Stanford was a decision to overweight value credit significantly,” Powers said.

He said many market players—including individuals, corporations, investment management firms and sovereign wealth funds—attempted to lower their levels of indebtedness in late 2008 and early 2009.

“That meant that people were selling off credit exposure because they had to, not because that made good economic sense,” Powers said. “During that period of time, we were buying some of that exposure, and that exposure has performed really well over the last year and a half.”

He added that Stanford chose to underweight real estate at a time when these assets experienced a relatively tough year, a decision that ultimately helped bolster the University’s financial position.

All in all, the robust investment returns have relieved some of the pressure on the University pocketbook. From a risk management point of view, gains in the merged pool have helped improve Stanford’s liquidity position, Powers said.

Moreover, with the budgeted payout for fiscal year 2011 set at 5.5 percent of the endowment’s beginning-of-year value, growth in the value of the endowment enables a higher level of payout. The endowment payout for 2010-2011 is slated to be approximately $758 million.

Stanford’s investment gains are also strong relative to returns at peer institutions. Stanford outperformed Harvard, Yale and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in the 12 months that ended June 30, 2010.

Harvard reported an 11 percent investment return, placing its endowment at $27.4 billion. Yale’s endowment grew to $16.7 billion and took in an 8.9 percent investment gain. MIT announced a 10.2 percent investment return and an endowment of $8.3 billion.

Columbia outpaced the pack; the New York-based university saw its investments increase by 17.3 percent and boosted a $6.5 billion endowment, according to the Columbia Spectator.

Despite Stanford’s strong showing, its endowment remains $3.4 billion shy of its $17.2 billion value two years ago.

Looking Forward

While the recent investment returns are impressive, it is uncertain whether they can be sustained in the long term.

“We’re optimistic about a long-term ability to grow value,” Powers said. “But 14 percent is a great year and we should appreciate it as such.”

“It’s important to keep in mind that what we’re trying to do is to compound over five-, 10-, 20-year periods,” he added.

In that vein, the merged pool has increased from $5.8 billion to $15.8 billion in the past decade, earning an annualized return of 6.9 percent.

In the current fiscal year, the Stanford Management Company hopes to complete a top-to-bottom overhaul of its approach toward asset allocation and risk management.

According to Powers, the SMC has made incremental improvements in its liquidity position and will continue to shift towards a mix of assets that have lower correlation to global equity markets.

These strategies, coupled with the guidance of a strong investment team, will largely define SMC’s agenda in 2010-2011.

In “Powers talks investment” (Oct. 4), the graphic misstated Stanford’s investment gains as 5.5 percent for the recent year. As the story correctly reported, the University’s principal investment pool gained 14.4 percent in the year ending June 30, 2010. The endowment grew 9.6 percent in the year ending Aug. 31, 2010. The budgeted endowment payout for fiscal year 2011 is set at 5.5 percent of the endowment’s beginning-of-year value.

  • john

    Powers should have been fired after losing one-quarter of Stanford’s endowment last year. No one at SMC was held accountable for that fiasco. There should have been a lot of people fired. These gamblers make high risk “investments” in hopes of being paid a big bonus. If their gamble fails there is no downside because no one gets fired.

    Also many of the fixed investments are vastly inflated in book value to make SMC look like it is doing far better than it really is.

  • ’13

    Agreed with john. Powers should have been booted last year for running his fund of funds roulette.

    “It’s important not to confuse investment genius with a bull market.” – Druckenmiller

  • Kyle

    Wow, (comment above) you need to settle down a bit and brush up on some history and gain some context for the returns last year. This is what you should do before you make a comment like that. Go and plot the returns of Stanford (the reports are public) against the S&P 500, Lehman Agg, an 80/20 split or any other index. Since your actually not going to do it, how about I’ll just tell you what you’re going to find. You are going to see that the managers of the Stanford endowment stellar! Sure, a quarter of the value of the endowment was lost last year from June to June. Did you see what happened in the market during that same time? It was also down ¼! So, let me clarify this for you. The endowment KILLS the market for 20 years, driving the endowment to $18 Bn in 2008, yet you see one bad year and you’re calling for the resignation of John Powers? Simmer down. This is the first time Stanford has actually beaten the top 5 endowments on the June year numbers in over a decade. So John beats the market one year, beats the other elite endowments the other year, and about 200 bps below the market another year…and you say he should get fired?!

    The truth is Stanford and the students should count themselves lucky to have Powers and that team at the helm. Do you know how much these people can make working in alternative investment shops? Why don’t you try and guess the salary multiple on the last flock of mangers that left to go start Makena Capital?

    Also, what are you talking about with fixed investments? My guess is that your not as well informed on those valuations as you think you are.

    You can try to make your arguments based on passion, but empirically you are way off base. There is a great book for you to read Pioneering Portfolio Management that might provide a better perspective than your current view.

  • ’13

    Kyle, most of your claims are simply unfounded. First of all, why are we comparing a university portfolio comprised of public equities, natural resources, fixed income, real estate, etc. to the S&P 500, Lehman Agg. or 80/20 – all seem like irrelevant comparisons? Second of all, I question the need for comparison in general. Many funds – and perhaps university endowments should take this more seriously – focus on absolute returns, not relative. If we’re so interested in relative returns why don’t we just invest the whole fund in a low-cost equity index ETF then we’ll always be in-line with a benchmark.

    Either we think 1) we can do do better 2) our risk profile does not fit these investments. Universities need to start thinking more about point number 2 before they obsess with point 1. The long-term preservation of capital for our university is, at least to me, more important than obtaining equity-like returns. Just because we’ve weathered a recent financial crisis doesn’t mean the horizon is free of storms. Perhaps you disagree.

    If Powers is as good as you claim maybe he should go start a Makena Capital.

  • Kyle

    Excellent comments “13″. The criticism offered by the prior comments was that the endowment team should be fired because they take on risk with no consequences. You’re right the equity and fixed income indices alone are not comparable to the current endowment. However, comparisons provide context for the strategy that most of the elite institutions have taken in the last 15 years. If we were to simply look at actual benchmarks matched to asset classes—it would be a great evaluation of John Powers but a poor metric for the overall strategy. So I offered simple alternatives.
    “13” you have the right ideas about preservation of capital but the wrong context. Take a look at the endowment report from last year.

    https://docs.google.com/viewer?url=http://www.stanfordmanage.org/Annual_Report.pdf

    If the main concern is preservation of capital, the strategy has more than doubled since 1999 (this is including .com bubble and the recent crisis) and that’s not including the payout to the university. What are you suggesting as an alternative “13”?

  • ’13

    Well I think that first of all the university’s endowment fund should become proprietary. Right now much of the university’s assets are invested in all sorts of hedge funds/private equity fund/etc — “Within each asset class, we endeavor to place capital with a diversified set of managers across geographies and investment strategies”…that garner fees up to 2-20 (and sometimes worse). At 12.6 billion for the start of the year, potential fees to funds may have been as high as 1.2 billion (12.6*0.02 + (17.4-12.6)*.2)! Although I doubt the entire endowment is invested in such expensive products the true numbers are not disclosed. Powers claims that it’s a small price to pay for the bad PR rep (he loves to comment that although Harvard uses a proprietary system they have had only slightly better returns – but he fails to understand that these slightly better returns are a result of investment decisions…not ways of carrying out these investments). We definitely have a large enough asset pool to go proprietary. The point is we could invest in far safer assets such as AAA debt….solid stuff basically. Yes we wouldn’t be getting these returns in bull market years but at the same time we’d be responsibly investing a pool of generous donations and not do things like losing 26% in times of crises. The university’s 5.5% payout is doable but greed convinces endowment managers to take additional risks in the reach for yield. Heck if I’m an alum and my donation supports payouts at 5% a year I wouldn’t be so unhappy.

  • Kyle

    “13″ I still think your vision is a bit short sighted. If the endowment had taken the approach you are suggesting for the last 19 years the payout of the endowment would be a small fraction of what has been. While donations make up an original base to invest, the growth and payout of these mega endowments has come from being able to access the best investment managers in the world.

    Check out NACUBO’s endowment study. The numbers they show are not fantastic to pick apart, but they will do the job. The % growth in the endowment excludes endowment payout so it’s not a return number. They have the endowment growth since 1990. And if you’re an academic, you can email them and get their full data set to check out growth since the early 1980’s.

    In 1990 the value of the endowment was 2.1Bn
    https://docs.google.com/viewer?url=http://www.nacubo.org/documents/1990%2520Total%2520Market%2520Values.pdf

    In 2009 the value was 12.6Bn and 17.2Bn in 2008.
    https://docs.google.com/viewer?url=http://www.nacubo.org/Documents/research/2009_NCSE_Public_Tables_Endowment_Market_Values.pdf

    Let’s say Stanford received 500MM in donations every year since 1990. This is an aggressive estimate for the most recent funding achievements in the last two years, but a conservative estimate for the 90’s. If you also factor in a 5% annual payout, which does not include a larger payout Stanford made during the late 90’s for their escapades using government grants (they lost US funding for a period–see Pioneering Portfolio Management) the endowment today would be worth ~12.5 billion using a 5.7% growth rate every year (aggressive for AAA) and would have paid out ~7Bn over the last 19 years. Now if the endowment followed its actual growth path and had a 9.1% return over that 19 year period it would have grown to 17Bn in 2008 before tanking in 2009 to 12 Bn. Here is the key—the payout of the endowment over that period is 2Bn more (a conservative estimate for donations and payout rates). In spite of what it might seem the actual size of $2Bn is quite large (think of how much John Arrillaga has built on campus and he is worth around 1.4Bn wiki).

    Sure they could have followed the conservative course you suggest and ended up around the same endowment size, but Stanford would not have made 14% return this year, and none of the swanky new buildings on campus would have been built with the extra 2Bn in funding.

Login to your account

Can't remember your Password ?

Register for this site!